

topDNS Report: Monthly Analysis for ISPs

**An initiative by eco –
Association of the Internet Industry
in collaboration with AV-TEST**

April 2026



topDNS

An initiative by **eco**



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ASSOCIATION OF THE
INTERNET INDUSTRY



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Report Summary

This report is the fourth publication in its second year from the topDNS Initiative's measurement initiative, topDNS Report: Monthly Analysis for ISPs. The purpose of this report is to provide a credible and consistent source of metrics for addressing abuse among Internet Service Providers (ISPs). We hope that it will facilitate targeted discussions and pinpoint opportunities to reduce abuse throughout the entire Internet ecosystem.

Key highlights from the overall data in the month of March 2026 include:

- **Malicious URL volumes rebounded in March, driven by renewed malware growth, though remaining well below late-2025 peak levels.**

Total malicious URLs increased to **817,161**, representing a **+30.13%** month-on-month rise from February (**627,969**). This rebound was driven predominantly by malware, which rose to **774,368** and accounted for approximately **95%** of total malicious activity, marking one of the highest shares observed in recent months. Despite this increase, overall volumes remain substantially below the **December 2025 peak (2,885,933)** and are more closely aligned with the upper range observed during mid-2025. This confirms that the sharp post-December correction has stabilised into a moderate recovery phase rather than a return to peak conditions.

- **PUAs declined to 16,914 (-28.39%),** resuming their broader downward trend following February's temporary increase. In contrast, **'other' malicious URLs rose to 25,879 (+51.91%),** reaching their highest level in several months, though still accounting for only a small share (approximately **3%**) of total activity. Overall, the distribution has shifted back towards stronger malware dominance following the slight diversification observed in February, reinforcing the structurally malware-heavy composition of the threat landscape.

- **Phishing activity recovered from February's low but remains structurally subdued relative to earlier in the reporting period.**

All (potential) phishing URLs increased to **61,043 (+54.58%),** rebounding from February's minimum (**39,489**). Despite this increase, volumes remain significantly below earlier levels such as the April 2025 peak (**542,081**) and the reporting-period average (**188,873**), indicating that the broader downward trend in phishing activity remains intact.

- **Detection metrics increased across all verification methods, indicating a genuine rise in phishing activity rather than methodological effects.**

All detection approaches recorded substantial increases, with machine learning detections rising to **19,202 (+38.78%),** visual AI detections increasing to **31,234**



(+280.81%), and combined-method detections reaching **14,304 (+273.96%)**. The consistency of these increases across methodologies suggests that the observed rise reflects a recovery in detectable phishing activity rather than being solely attributable to changes in detection coverage. However, detection volumes remain below January 2026 levels, indicating only a partial recovery rather than a full return to earlier activity levels.

- **Malicious activity remains highly concentrated within the Top 50 ASNs, with malware continuing to dominate.**

The Top 50 ASNs accounted for 778,453 malicious URLs in March, of which 739,897 (95.05%) were malware. PUAs and 'other' categories together comprised less than 5% of activity within these networks. Despite the increase from February (593,584), the concentration profile remains largely unchanged, confirming the persistent centralisation of malicious infrastructure within a relatively small number of large hosting networks.

We encourage all readers to review this report and its methodology, as well as the data, and to contact us with any questions, ideas or suggestions that could help us improve and expand it. After all, our goal is to help the Internet industry and the wider community become better equipped to fight online abuse. The topDNS Initiative will publish this and future reports on the [topDNS website](#).

For more information on the topDNS Initiative's mission and the data and sources used, please refer to the 'Background' section at the end of this document.



Methodology

Understanding general trends in online abuse is useful for grasping phishing and malware across the ISP ecosystem, as well as identifying high-level trends over time. This report presents aggregated data for all months recorded at the time of publication.

The malware methodology includes the following labels:

- **Malware:** The majority of AV-TEST's scan results conclude that the sample belongs to the 'malware' category. This includes classic viruses and Trojans, but is also subdivided internally into malware families and names.
- **PUA:** This stands for 'Potentially Unwanted Application'. Such applications/samples do not directly exhibit malware behaviour, but they can disrupt the user experience through aggressive advertising, hidden functions, or impaired system performance.
- **Other:** This includes samples that cannot be attributed automatically to malware or potentially unwanted applications (PUAs).

Each URL is followed by a downloadable file (either directly or as a web page in the form of an HTML file). These files are downloaded and analysed by AV-TEST tools (VTEST -> AV multi-scanner system). These downloaded files are referred to as 'samples'.

The phishing methodology includes the following labels:

- **Potential Phishing:** URLs/websites that AV-TEST receives from phishing blocklists or whose source code generates a 'phishing' detection in VTEST's static analysis are declared as 'potential phishing'. (Potential) Phishing URLs are not only downloaded, but also visualised via a browser screenshot, which is used for AV-TEST's visual phishing analysis (Phinder).
- **Verified Phishing:** All 'Potential Phishing' URLs are checked with an automated visual comparison of the screenshots. This is based on manual pre-work, where screenshots are classified as 'Phishing' or 'No Phishing' by AV-TEST staff. If a 'Potential Phishing' URL is found to be similar to a 'Verified Phishing' URL, it is automatically classified as such.

This report uses the following definitions for Uniform Resource Locator (URL), Internet Service Provider (ISP), and Autonomous System Number (ASN):

- **Uniform Resource Locator (URL):** A URL is the address of a specific resource on the Internet. It consists of several components, including the protocol (e.g., HTTP or HTTPS), the domain name (e.g., example.com), and the path to the resource (e.g., /page). URLs are used to locate and access websites, images, videos, and other online content.



- **Internet Service Provider (ISP):** An ISP is a company or organisation that provides Internet access to individuals and businesses. ISPs offer various connection types, including broadband, fibre, DSL and mobile data. ISPs are responsible for transferring data between users and the Internet, and they often offer additional services such as email hosting and web hosting, and security features.
- **Autonomous System Number (ASN):** An ASN is a unique identifier assigned to an Autonomous System (AS), which is a network or group of Internet Protocol (IP) prefixes under the control of a single administrative entity, such as an Internet Service Provider (ISP), cloud provider, or large enterprise.



Chart: Aggregate Malware Trends

This chart provides a high-level view of how many malicious URLs with ASNs have been identified by the methodology and how abuse on the Internet is changing over time. It shows the absolute volume of unique URLs the methodology has identified that are engaged in phishing, malware, PUA and other malware, broken down by category:

- **Malware URLs**
- **PUA URLs**
- **Other URLs**

A **total of 11,244,425 malicious URLs with ASNs** were identified in the period April 2025 to March 2026, of which:

- **10,698,143 URLs** could be **verified as malware**,
- **343,490 URLs** have been **classified as PUA**, and
- **202,792 URLs** as **other**.

The **highest level of malware** activity was recorded in **December 2025 (2,885,933 URLs)**, representing the **peak of the late-2025 surge** and **significantly exceeding all prior months**. Following this spike, volumes declined sharply in January and February 2026, before rebounding in March 2026 to **774,368 (+31.85%)**, indicating a partial recovery rather than a continuation of the earlier contraction phase. Furthermore, **PUA activity exhibited substantial volatility over the reporting period**. It peaked in **July 2025 (105,835 URLs)**, followed by a sharp decline in the second half of the year, reaching a low in **January 2026 (12,101)**. In March 2026, PUAs declined again to **16,914 (-28.39%)**, suggesting that February's increase was temporary and that the broader downward trend remains intact. In addition, **'Other' malicious content** followed a different trajectory. In March 2026, this category increased to **25,879 (+51.91%)**, marking its highest level in the current reporting window, though still representing only a minor share of total activity. Across the full period, monthly averages amounted to approximately **891,512 malware URLs, 28,624 PUAs, and 16,899 'other' malicious URLs**, highlighting the persistent imbalance between categories.

Overall, the data indicate that while the extreme spike observed in late 2025 has largely unwound, malware continues to dominate the threat landscape structurally. The March rebound suggests renewed activity, but not a return to peak conditions. Instead, current levels point to a stabilization at elevated baseline levels relative to early and mid-2025, with only limited diversification into PUA and 'other' categories.



Malicious URLs




Figure 1: Aggregate Malware Trends - Malicious URLs - March 2026

History of Malicious URLs




Figure 2: Aggregate Malware Trends - History of Malicious URLs - April 2025 to March 2026



History of Malicious URLs

	Malware	Change	PUA	Change	Other	Change
Apr 2025	401,518		18,739		14,600	
May 2025	396,207	-1.32%	21,305	+13.69%	12,011	-17.73%
Jun 2025	615,448	+55.33%	54,207	+154.43%	18,942	+57.71%
July 2025	612,196	-0.53%	105,835	+95.24%	15,686	-17.19%
Aug 2025	638,238	+4.25%	19,551	-81.53%	13,272	-15.39%
Sep 2025	647,740	+1.49%	27,242	+39.34%	23,270	+75.33%
Oct 2025	979,973	+51.29%	15,734	-42.24%	15,728	-32.41%
Nov 2025	1,264,566	+29.04%	15,433	-1.91%	18,301	+16.36%
Dec 2025	2,885,933	+128.22%	12,808	-17.01%	14,457	-21.00%
Jan 2026	894,644	-69.00%	12,101	-5.52%	13,610	-5.86%
Feb 2026	587,312	-34.35%	23,621	+95.20%	17,036	+25.17%
Mar 2026	774,368	+31.85%	16,914	-28.39%	25,879	+51.91%
Total	10,698,143		343,490		202,792	

Table 1: Aggregate Malware Trends - History of Malicious URLs - April 2025 to March 2026

Key Figures of Malicious URLs

	Malware	Month	PUA	Month	Other	Change
High	2,885,933	Dec 2025	105,835	Jul 2025	25,879	Mar 2026
Low	396,207	May 2025	12,101	Jan 2026	12,011	May 2025
Average	891,512		28,624		16,899	

Table 2: Aggregate Trends - Key Figures of Malicious URLs - April 2025 to March 2026



Commentary

The aggregate dataset covering April 2025 to March 2026 identified a total of 11,244,425 malicious URLs associated with ASNs, of which 10,698,143 URLs were classified as malware, 343,490 URLs were classified as PUA, and 202,792 URLs as other malicious content.

Compared to the previous reporting window, **total volumes increased, reflecting the inclusion of March 2026 data and the partial rebound** observed following the early-2026 contraction phase.

The highest level of malware activity was recorded in December 2025 (2,885,933 URLs), representing the peak within the reporting window and **significantly exceeding the previous high in November 2025**. Following this spike, malware volumes declined sharply in **January 2026 (-69.00%)** and continued to decrease in February, before rising again in **March 2026 (+31.85%)**. This pattern indicates a transition from a correction phase into a more moderate recovery, rather than a return to the extreme levels observed in late 2025.

PUA activity followed a more volatile trajectory. After peaking in **July 2025 (105,835 URLs)**, volumes declined sharply through the second half of the year, reaching a low in **January 2026 (12,101)**. **While February saw a temporary rebound, March recorded a renewed decline to 16,914 (-28.39%)**, suggesting that the broader downward trend remains intact despite short-term fluctuations.

'Other' malicious content exhibited a different pattern, remaining comparatively low through most of the reporting period before increasing in March 2026 to **25,879 (+51.91%)**, the highest level in the current reporting window. This indicates some short-term variability, but no structural shift in category composition.

As reflected in Table 2, malware activity ranged from a low of **396,207 URLs (May 2025)** to a peak of **2,885,933 (December 2025)**, representing a more than sevenfold increase across the reporting period. PUAs and 'other' categories showed narrower but still significant variation, with both categories characterised by peaks followed by sustained declines and partial recoveries.

Overall, the data confirms the continued structural dominance of malware within the malicious URL landscape. While the late-2025 surge has largely unwound, the rebound observed in March 2026 suggests that activity levels are stabilising above early-2025 baselines. The distribution across categories remains heavily skewed towards malware, with only limited and temporary diversification into PUA and 'other' classifications.



Chart: Aggregate Phishing Trends

This chart provides an overview of how many phishing URLs with ASNs have been identified by the methodology and illustrates how phishing on the Internet is changing over time. It shows the absolute volume of unique URLs identified by the methodology as being involved in the distribution of phishing, broken down by category:

- **(Potential) Phishing URLs**
- **Verified Phishing URLs**

A total of **2,266,479 (potential) phishing URLs** and **118,852 verified phishing URLs** were identified in the period from April 2025 to March 2026.

The data show pronounced volatility in overall volumes, alongside a sustained decline in verified activity through late 2025 and early 2026.

All (potential) phishing activity peaked in **April 2025 (542,081 URLs)** and declined sharply through May, June and July, before fluctuating in the second half of the year. After reaching a low point in **February 2026 (39,489)**, volumes rebounded in **March 2026 to 61,043 (+54.58%)**, indicating a short-term recovery following the earlier contraction.

Verified phishing followed a partially similar but more compressed trajectory. After peaking in **May 2025 (21,492 URLs)**, volumes declined through mid-2025, stabilised briefly in late 2025, and then fell sharply in early 2026 to a minimum of **1,691 in February 2026**. In March 2026, verified phishing increased to **3,982 (+135.48%)**, representing a partial recovery, though still remaining at comparatively low levels within the reporting window.

The verification rate, meaning verified phishing as a share of potential phishing, varied significantly over time, peaking in **December 2025 (14.80%)** before declining steadily into early 2026. In March 2026, the verification rate increased to **6.52%**, reflecting a recovery from February's low but remaining below late-2025 levels.

Additional detection metrics further support these trends. In March 2026, **19,202 URLs** were identified via machine learning, **31,234** via visual AI, and **14,304** through combined methods, indicating a broad-based increase across detection approaches. While these results are not mutually exclusive, they collectively point to a rebound in observable phishing activity following the February low.

Overall, the data indicate that **while phishing activity increased in March 2026**, volumes remain structurally lower than earlier in the reporting period. The rebound is therefore best interpreted as a short-term fluctuation within a broader downward trend, rather than a sustained escalation in phishing activity



History of Phishing URLs




Figure 3: Aggregate Trends - History of Phishing URLs - April 2025 to March 2026

Over the past year, AV-TEST has further expanded its phishing analysis in order to distinguish more reliably between verified phishing URLs and the wider set of potential phishing URLs.

In this report, 'verified phishing' refers to URLs that AV-TEST has assessed using visual similarity analysis against phishing websites that have already been manually validated. Where websites are found to be visually highly similar and/or identical to the 'verified phishing' data, they may also be classified automatically as verified phishing. One limitation of this approach is that new phishing URLs must still be validated manually on an ongoing basis. To address this issue, additional indicators will be introduced in future editions of this report:

- **Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning**

Under this approach, URLs and website content are classified using a self-trained machine learning model and visual AI techniques based on AV-TEST's dataset of verified phishing URLs. As is typical for machine learning, it is not possible to define a fixed set of explicit classification parameters.

In March 2026, this approach identified 19,202 phishing URLs with ASNs via machine learning, 31,234 via visual AI, with 14,304 URLs identified by both methods (Figure 4, Table 3). These results are not mutually exclusive, as there is a measurable



overlap between detection methods. All identified URLs form part of the total of 61,043 potential phishing URLs with ASNs.

History of Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI




Figure 4: Aggregate Trends - History of Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI - January 2026 to March 2026

- **Phishing URLs verified by Visual AI**

Additionally, AV-TEST uses local Large Language Models (LLMs) with image processing capabilities to analyse URLs, website content, and screenshots, extracting features that are typical of phishing sites. Additionally, several parameters are extracted in this process, including:

- Is it a domain parking page
- Is it an error code page
- Which company is being imitated
- Which industry sector does the company belong to

This method identified 31,234 phishing URLs with ASNs in March 2026. These were included in the total of 61,043 potential phishing URLs with ASNs. Regarding the 3,982 verified phishing URLs, those verified by visual AI also represent a separate category.



- **Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI**

This category represents a combination of both methods to classify URLs and website content as phishing.

In this category, 14,304 phishing URLs with ASNs were identified in March 2026.

These were included in the total of 61,043 potential phishing URLs with ASNs. Regarding the 3,982 verified phishing URLs, those verified by visual AI represent a separate category. There is an overlap with the 'verified by Machine Learning' and 'verified by Visual AI' categories.

History of Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI

	Verified by Machine Learning	Change	Verified by Visual AI	Change	Verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI	Change
Jan 2026	70,757		41,243		32,241	
Feb 2026	13,836	-80.45%	8,202	-80.11%	3,825	-88.14%
Mar 2026	19,202	+38.78%	31,234	+280.81%	14,304	+273.96%
Total	103,795		80,679		50,370	

Table 3: Aggregate Trends - History of Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI - January 2026 to March 2026

Key Figures of Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI

	Verified by Machine Learning	Change	Verified by Visual AI	Change	Verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI	Change
High	70,757	Jan 2026	41,243	Jan 2026	32,241	Jan 2026
Low	13,836	Feb 2026	8,202	Feb 2026	3,825	Feb 2026
Average	34,598		26,893		16,790	

Table 4: Aggregate Trends - Key Figures of Phishing URLs verified by Machine Learning & Visual AI - January 2026 to March 2026



History of All (Potential) and verified Phishing URLs

	All (potential) phishing	Change	Share	Verified phishing	Change
Apr 2025	542,081		1.72%	9,297	
May 2025	406,756	-24.96%	5.28%	21,492	+131.17%
Jun 2025	256,529	-36.93%	6.20%	15,907	-25.99%
July 2025	160,240	-37.54%	12.27%	19,656	+23.57%
Aug 2025	169,908	+6.03%	4.36%	7,414	-62.28%
Sept 2025	235,013	+38.32%	2.57%	6,036	-18.59%
Oct 2025	161,406	-31.32%	5.37%	8,662	+43.51%
Nov 2025	84,658	-47.55%	10.98%	9,295	+7.31%
Dec 2025	63,090	-25.48%	14.80%	9,339	+0.47%
Jan 2026	86,266	+36.73%	7.05%	6,081	-34.89%
Feb 2026	39,489	-54.22%	4.28%	1,691	-72.19%
Mar 2026	61,043	+54.58%	6.52%	3,982	+135.48%
Total	2,266,479		6.35%	118,852	

Table 5: Aggregate Trends - History of All (Potential) and Verified Phishing URLs - April 2025 to March 2026

Key Figures of All (Potential) and Verified Phishing URLs

	All (potential) phishing	Month		Verified phishing	Month
High	542,081	Apr 2025		21,492	May 2025
Low	39,489	Feb 2026		1,691	Feb 2026
Average	188,873			9,904	

Table 6: Aggregate Trends - Key Figures of All (Potential) and Verified Phishing URLs - April 2025 to March 2026



Commentary

The aggregated dataset covering **April 2025 to March 2026** identified a total of **2,266,479 (potential) phishing URLs** and **118,852 verified phishing URLs** associated with ASNs. Compared to the previous reporting window, overall volumes declined, reflecting the sustained contraction in phishing activity observed from mid-2025 through early 2026, despite the partial recovery recorded in March.

All (potential) phishing activity reached its peak in **April 2025 (542,081 URLs)** before declining sharply in the following months. This downward trend continued, with intermittent fluctuations, culminating in a low point in **February 2026 (39,489)**. In **March 2026, volumes increased to 61,043 (+54.58%)**, indicating a short-term rebound following the February minimum, but remaining significantly below earlier levels in the reporting period.

Verified phishing followed a broadly similar but more compressed trajectory. After peaking in **May 2025 (21,492 URLs)**, confirmed cases declined through mid-2025 and stabilised briefly towards the end of the year. This stability did not persist into 2026, with verified phishing falling sharply to **1,691 in February 2026**, the lowest level in the dataset. In **March 2026, verified phishing rose to 3,982 (+135.48%)**, representing a notable increase, though still among the lowest volumes observed across the reporting window.

The share of verified phishing within total (potential) phishing URLs exhibited considerable variation over time. It peaked in **December 2025 (14.80%)**, reflecting a period characterised by lower overall volumes but a higher concentration of confirmed threats. This pattern reversed in early 2026, with the verification rate declining to **4.28% in February**, before recovering to **6.52% in March 2026**. Despite this increase, the verification rate remains below late-2025 levels, indicating that the structural shift towards higher confirmation intensity has not resumed.

Detection metrics provide further context for these trends. Following the sharp declines observed in February, all detection methods recorded substantial increases in March, including **machine learning, visual AI, and combined approaches**. The consistency of this increase across methodologies suggests that the rebound reflects a genuine rise in phishing activity rather than changes in detection coverage or effectiveness. However, detection volumes remain below January 2026 levels, reinforcing the interpretation of a partial recovery rather than a full return to prior activity levels.

Overall, the data highlights a continued **structural suppression of phishing activity** relative to early and mid-2025. While March 2026 shows a clear rebound across multiple indicators, the broader trend remains one of reduced volume and lower confirmation rates. The current pattern suggests a stabilisation at lower activity levels, rather than the onset of a renewed escalation in phishing threats.



Chart: Aggregated Share of Top50 ASNs

This table provides an anonymised high-level overview of the 50 largest autonomous systems identified by their assigned autonomous system number (ASN).

A total of **10,502,237 URLs with ASNs** were identified among the Top50 ASNs in March 2026, of which:

- **9,994,041 URLs** could be **verified as malware**,
- **341,836 URLs** have been **classified as PUA**, and
- **166,360 URLs** as **other**.

If you are a network operator, please contact us for further details which of the URLs mentioned above are assigned to your autonomous system number (ASN): topdns@eco.de

Aggregated Share of Top 50 ASNs

	Malware	Share	PUA	Share	Other	Share	Total
Apr 2025	343,056	91.93%	18,154	4.86%	11,971	3.21%	373,181
May 2025	337,196	92.09%	19,209	5.25%	9,767	2.67%	366,172
Jun 2025	494,633	88.07%	52,762	9.39%	14,233	2.53%	561,628
July 2025	520,073	81.60%	104,899	16.46%	12,383	1.94%	637,355
Aug 2025	547,454	94.79%	19,470	3.37%	10,600	1.84%	577,524
Sept 2025	658,068	92.69%	28,218	3.97%	23,672	3.33%	709,958
Oct 2025	907,850	96.97%	15,095	1.61%	13,261	1.42%	936,206
Nov 2025	1,199,728	97.51%	14,768	1.20%	15,813	1.29%	1,230,309
Dec 2025	2,833,805	99.14%	12,093	0.42%	12,374	0.43%	2,858,272
Jan 2026	856,332	97.36%	11,664	1.33%	11,599	1.32%	879,595
Feb 2026	555,949	93.66%	22,856	3.85%	14,779	2.49%	593,584
Mar 2026	739,897	95.05%	22,648	2.91%	15,908	2.04%	778,453
Total	9,994,041		341,836		166,360		10,502,237

Table 7: Aggregate Trends - Aggregated Share of Top 50 ASNs - April 2025 to March 2026



Commentary

The aggregate dataset for the Top 50 ASNs covering April 2025 to March 2026 identified a total of **10,502,237 malicious URLs**. Of these, **9,994,041 URLs (95.16%) were linked to malware**, **341,836 URLs (3.25%) to PUA**, and **166,360 URLs (1.58%) to other malicious content**. This confirms a persistent and pronounced concentration of malicious activity within a relatively small number of large hosting networks.

Malware dominance remained structurally consistent throughout the reporting period, intensifying markedly in late 2025. **December 2025** recorded the peak at **2,833,805 malware URLs (99.14% share)**, far exceeding prior months. Following this surge, total volumes declined sharply in **January and February 2026**, before **increasing again in March 2026 to 778,453 total URLs**, indicating a partial recovery phase rather than a return to peak conditions. Despite these fluctuations, malware continued to account for the overwhelming majority of activity, with **95.05% share in March 2026**, among the highest levels observed outside the December peak.

PUA activity exhibited significant variability. After reaching a high in **July 2025 (104,899; 16.46%)**, volumes declined substantially through the second half of the year, reaching **11,664 in January 2026**, before recovering to **22,648 (2.91%) in March 2026**. While this represents a modest rebound, PUAs remain a comparatively small component of overall activity within Top 50 ASNs.

'Other' malicious content followed a similar pattern of early higher values followed by sustained lower levels. In **March 2026**, this category accounted for **15,908 URLs (2.04%)**, indicating relative stability at low levels and no meaningful structural increase in its share.

Overall, the data underscores the **continued centralisation of malicious infrastructure within major autonomous systems**, with malware as the primary driver. Although absolute volumes have moderated following the late-2025 spike, the structural concentration remains unchanged. These dynamics continue to support **targeted, ASN-level mitigation strategies** as an effective approach to reducing large-scale malware distribution.



Background

Mission

The topDNS Initiative (<https://topdns.eco>) was founded in 2021 by members of eco – Association of the Internet Industry. The stable, safe and secure operation of the DNS has proven to be the foundation for the global expansion of the Internet as a universal public resource. However, like any other innovation and every technology, the Internet and the DNS are vulnerable to abuse, such as malware, botnets, phishing, pharming or spam. The topDNS Initiative and its members are committed to reducing online abuse and strengthening the Internet industry.

This report aims to measure malicious URLs at ISPs to improve the community's understanding of online abuse and ultimately enhance industry practices. We hope it will provide insight into how online abuse is changing over time, enabling concrete, specific conversations about the impact of abuse on not only the domain registration industry, but the Internet industry as a whole.

We intend to use this evidence to drive change within the Internet industry, improving understanding of where online abuse is concentrated and discussing effective ways to prevent and mitigate it. Our aim is to highlight good and best practices, as well as identifying areas for improvement and issues that require attention.

Online abuse affects everyone. We aim to leverage this insight to enhance the overall health of the Internet ecosystem. Our goal is to prevent or swiftly mitigate any harm to end users, businesses, governments, civil society organisations, public services and the general public, while safeguarding the advantages and principles of an open Internet.

Although the ultimate goal is to reduce abuse, mitigation should still take place at the appropriate level. The aim is to provide transparent resources for discussions about the prevalence and mitigation of phishing and malware on the open Internet.

Data & Sources

This report is a collaboration with AV-TEST, a member of the [Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization](#), analysing samples from various sources with AV-TEST's AV Multiscanner system as well as static and dynamic analysis tools. The report aims to provide the industry with evidence and information on the distribution of phishing and malware across the ecosystem. The project will begin by examining the harm caused by malware and phishing. Phishing and malware have been chosen as the focus because there is generally sufficient verifiable evidence of the security threat they pose.

In future reports, we may include other types of abuse and additional metrics, or combine various data points, provided they are consistent with the mission of topDNS and the priorities



chosen for this report. The topDNS Initiative also works very closely with other initiatives, such as the NetBeacon Institute, to work together on data and to reduce online abuse. As a result, we view this report as a complement to the [NetBeacon MAP: Monthly Analysis](#) which provides detailed statistics and data for domain name registries and registrars.

It is important to recognise the limitations of this work. The universal challenge of understanding malicious activity in society means that we can only measure identified and verified harm.

Phishing and malware that has been identified and verified will always be a subset of all existing phishing and malware. There will also be 'false positives', i.e. URLs categorised as phishing or malware when they actually aren't, due to classification errors and differences in standards. Additionally, there is a possibility that reported abuse is biased towards particular geographic regions or activities that are more likely to be reported.

We are committed to refining this project as we go along, and we welcome insights from across the industry to help us improve and iterate. If you would like to get in touch with the topDNS Initiative, please contact: topdns@eco.de



About

eco – Association of the Internet Industry

With approximately 1,000 member companies, eco (<https://international.eco.de>) is the leading Association of the Internet Industry in Europe. Since 1995, eco has been highly instrumental in shaping the Internet, fostering new technologies, forming framework conditions, and representing the interests of its members in politics and international forums. eco has offices based in Cologne, Berlin and Brussels. In its work, eco primarily advocates for a high-performance, reliable and trustworthy ecosystem of digital infrastructures and services.

topDNS Initiative

The stable, safe and secure operation of the DNS has proven to be the foundation for the global expansion of the Internet as a universal public resource. However, like any other innovation and every technology, the Internet and the DNS are vulnerable to abuse, such as malware, botnets, phishing, pharming or spam. The topDNS Initiative (<https://topdns.eco>) and its members are committed to fighting DNS abuse.

AV-TEST Institute

AV-TEST (<https://www.av-test.org/en>) is an independent supplier of services in the fields of IT Security and Antivirus Research, focusing on the detection and analysis of the latest malicious software and its use in comprehensive comparative testing of security products.

Due to the timeliness of the testing data, malware can instantly be analysed and categorised, trends within virus development can be detected early, and IT-security solutions can be tested and certified. The AV-TEST Institute's results provide an exclusive basis of information helping vendors to optimize their products, special interest magazines to publish research data, and end users to make good product choices.

AV-TEST has operated out of Magdeburg (Germany) since 2004 and employs more than 30 team members, professionals with extensive practical experience. The AV-TEST laboratories include 500 client and server systems, where more than 3,500 terabytes of independently collected test data, containing both malicious and harmless sample information, are stored and processed.